Quick answer
It may include author and software metadata, an XMP packet, files, form values, links, and actions associated with opening the document or interacting with a page. Those features are often legitimate. This inspector reports evidence for review; it does not label a PDF malicious, authentic, anonymous, or safe.
No PDF upload
Inspect a PDF before sharing it
Ready. Choose a PDF to inspect its metadata and interactive features.
PDF privacy report
Document Info and XMP metadata
| Field | Source | Value |
|---|
Parsed PDF object signals
| Feature | Result | Evidence locations | Interpretation |
|---|
External destinations returned by PDF.js
| Location | Type | Destination |
|---|
Interpretation: “Not detected” means the inspected parsers did not return that common structure. It is not a security guarantee. The inspector does not execute JavaScript, open links, submit forms, or extract attachments.
Metadata and active content are different questions
Document Info
Classic properties such as Title, Author, Subject, Keywords, Creator, Producer, CreationDate, and ModDate. Creator usually names the source application; Producer usually names the software that wrote the PDF.
XMP metadata
An XML metadata stream can repeat or extend Document Info. Checking one source does not prove the other is absent, and conflicting values are possible.
Interactive content
Forms, links, attachments, and actions are document features. They can support normal workflows while still deserving review before a sensitive document is opened or distributed.
Security verdict
Requires much more than feature presence: hardened parsing, exploit detection, viewer-specific behavior, signatures, reputation, and often sandboxed execution. This browser tool deliberately does not claim that scope.
What the PDF specification actually defines
The official PDF 1.7 specification defines document-information dictionaries and metadata streams, file specifications and embedded-file streams, interactive forms, annotations, and action dictionaries. Adobe’s action reference lists JavaScript, Launch, SubmitForm, URI, and GoToR among the available action types. A JavaScript action executes a script; a Launch action asks a viewer to launch an application or open a document; SubmitForm sends form data to a URL.
NIST’s Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code describes active content broadly as electronic documents containing software components that can carry out or trigger actions. The practical lesson is not that every interactive PDF is hostile. It is that a document can be both content and a behavior container, and viewers do not all support or restrict those behaviors identically.
Reproducible privacy stress fixtures
The active fixture is intentionally synthetic and benign. It contains the author Ada Fixture, Document Info, XMP, one text field, one external link to example.com, one text attachment, and one document-level JavaScript action that writes a fixture string to a supporting viewer console. The minimal control contains a visible page and basic title/dates, but no XMP, form, link, attachment, or JavaScript.
Active-content fixture · Minimal control PDF · Expected results and SHA-256 · Poppler pdfinfo evidence · Poppler attachment evidence
How the inspection works
- Verify the PDF signature. A filename ending in
.pdfis not sufficient evidence. - Use PDF.js public document APIs. Metadata, XMP, attachments, fields, permissions, JavaScript events, and page annotations are requested without rendering or activating their destinations.
- Walk parsed indirect objects with PDF-LIB. Dictionaries and arrays are traversed after PDF decoding, so compressed object structures are more visible than they would be to a plain text search.
- Separate evidence from conclusions. Metadata values are displayed as data; feature keys are counted; neither becomes an automatic malware or authenticity label.
- Keep the report portable. CSV provides a concise review list. JSON preserves parser results, feature locations, permissions, fields, and caveats.
Limitations and safe use
This is not antivirus, a detonation sandbox, PDF signature validation, revision-history forensics, redaction verification, accessibility testing, PDF/A validation, or proof of authorship. It does not execute scripts, follow links, submit forms, or open attachments. Malformed objects, unsupported encryption, parser bugs, viewer-specific extensions, compressed payloads inside attachments, and new techniques can escape these checks.
A no-findings report means only that these versions of PDF.js and PDF-LIB did not return the covered signals. Treat unexpected documents according to your organization’s security policy and open them only in maintained software with appropriate sandboxing. Do not upload a confidential PDF merely to obtain a second opinion.
Frequently asked questions
What metadata can a PDF reveal?
Document Info and XMP can expose author, creator software, PDF producer, title, subject, keywords, and creation or modification dates. Metadata is evidence about fields stored in the file, not proof of who authored the visible content.
Can a PDF contain JavaScript or attachments?
Yes. PDF defines JavaScript actions, embedded-file streams, forms, URI actions, launch actions, and other interactive structures. Legitimate documents use these too, so detection means review—not “malware found.”
Does removing metadata make a PDF anonymous?
No. Visible names, comments, form values, filenames, unique wording, links, attachments, digital signatures, and the surrounding sharing context can still identify a person or organization.
Does this tool prove a PDF is safe?
No. It is a read-only privacy and common-structure preflight. Security analysis requires broader, continuously updated techniques and must account for the viewer that will open the file.